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ABSTRACT. -- Recent work of cognitive and social psychologists has questioned the
ability of subjects to accurately remember and report their experiences. This has
particular significance for recreation research as the survey questions we ask of
visitors change from more stable visit and group characteristics to reports of
conditions, experiences and feelings. Strategies exist to encourage accurate recall,
particlarly by minimizing the delay between event and report such as is provided by
the Experience Sampling Method.

INTRODUCTION
Many past studies of outdoor recreation have been based on the verbal reports of
visitors about their experiences. Not only have respondents been asked to recall and
quantify conditions they encountered on their trip, but they are often asked to identify
the feelings and concerns they had while making the trip. Some studies have asked
subjects to project from their experience to hypothetical situations, in order to locate
their preferred and ideal conditions for such a recreation experience. Each of these
approaches assumes that not only will respondents honestly report their opinions, but
that they have access to accurate recall of the on-site experience and their
psychological state at the time.

The ability of subjects to accurately remember and report their cognitive and
emotional states has come under scrutiny (for example, Nisbett and Wilson, 1977;
Stewart and Hull, 1992; Mannell and Iso-Ahola, 1987). These authors question
whether subjects can recall or identify the significant events or stimuli that may cause
a change in cognitive or behavioral states. This has led some writers to question the
validity and generalizability of findings based on verbal reports. People may have
little awareness or memory of actual events, their own behavior, or the physical
components of the environment (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Daniel and Ittelson, 1981;
Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Bernard et al., 1984). Instead, subjects use easily observed
or remembered cues to invoke broader cultural or environmental norms (Bradburn
et al., 1987). These more generic cognitive structures (memories, opinions,
stereotypes, etc.) often provide the basis for after-the-fact or post-hoc judgments.
Thus, verbal reports may represent little more than constructed memories or reports.
(In some cases the constructed version of events may be the desired report, but rarely
is this explicity acknowledged in the research effort.)
This paper lays out a brief critique of the use of verbal reports in the recall of
information, situations and experiences. In doing so, it will become apparent how
easily manipulated respondents may be in the interview or questionnaire process.
Strategies exist for improving the accuracy of verbal reports, thereby circumventing
some of the biases of memory and recall. However, the best solution is to avoid
reliance on the memory process, and the Experience Sampling Method is suggested as
a research methodology that minimizes the delay between the event and its recall and
report.

VALIDITY
CAUSAL REPORTS
The validity of self-reports was seriously and influentially questioned by Nisbett and
Wilson (1977). They questioned whether respondents have access to their own
cognitive processes. Their review of the literature and their own experimental results
led to the conclusion that subjects are no better at reporting the causes of their own
behavior than external observers. Nisbett and Wilson suggested that subjects gain
little assistance from their introspective access to cognitive processes, and rely on the
same learned causal relationships as do external observers. Thus, these observers of
the situation and the subject's behavior are just as capable at hypothesizing or
recalling culturally-based theories of behavior. Subsequent work has validated the
finding that actors are no better at causal reports than observers (Sprangers et al.,
1987; Wilson and Stone, 1985). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that respondents
have an imperfect memory of memory, and that the process of remembering alters the

recollection of events (Koriat, 1983). We must therefore differentiate verbal reports of
subject's introspection from their post-hoc rationalizations (Adair and Spinner, 1981).

ASKING AND INTERPRETING QUESTIONS
The validity of verbal reports lies in large measure in what we ask, and the manner in
which we ask it. As Adair and Spinner (1981) suggest : "to elicit accurate verbal
reports of cognitions requires that subjects have been given an appropriate set to truly
introspect" (p. 35). What we are asking subjects to report must be relevant and
available in their memory. Sometimes people just don't know or are unable to explain.
However subjects will still answer questions. People don't want to admit their
ignorance, and would rather appear socially aware and competent. In the absence of
specific memories, or of adequate interest in accurately describing events or
experiences, informants can turn to cultural norms for what is perceived to have
occurred (Bernard et al., 1984).
Subjects may have idiosyncratic theories or limited observations of covariation that
can both enhance or impair their reports (Wilson and Stone, 1985). Implicit theories
of behavior are constructed from their past at the time of questioning. Subjects are
prone to the illusory correlation phenomenon of over-estimating and overgeneralizing their own history of unique events, contexts and subsequent behavior
(Wallendorf and Brucks, 1993). For example, respondents know their own state at the
time of answering, and often construct an implicit theory to reach their supposed state
for the point of time they are being asked to recall. Bias in recall could be expected if,
as is likely, respondents are unaware or inaccurate in their estimate of the degree or
nature of change of the attribute across time (Pearson et al., 1992).
In particular, novel experiences quickly get generalized. They form the basis for both
interpreting new experiences and for determining how the event is remembered.
Frequent, yet similar, events also foster constructed memories and expectations (an
assimilation effect). Indeed, it has been found that generic memories are formed that
tend to blur together the specific time, location and context features (Jobe and
Mingay, 1991; Jobe et al., 1993; Strube, 1987). Unless specifically probed for,
respondents will find it easier to gloss over the specifics of an experience and instead
rely upon the generic memory. This is worrisome since the researcher has no control
over the boundaries of what is merged into the memory or judgment.
Furthermore, recalling or otherwise cognitively processing an experience in the
company of others, such as answering a post-trip questionnaire at home, will give rise
to secondary event representations (Strube, 1987). Recall and reporting of the event
will then reflect more of the memory of the event than as actually experienced. The
social context, in particular, in which the questionnaire is answered may be very

different than the situation and event being investigated. Researchers can try to avoid
these tendencies by breaking the experience down as specifically as possible by using
timelines, landmark events, specific probes and other decomposition tactics (Jobe and
Mingay, 1991).
The validity of verbal reports also depends on the perception by the respondent of
what the researcher is asking and his or her perception of what it is the researcher
wants in the way of a response. Willis et al. (1991) make the point that the retrieval of
information from memory for a survey response is not an automatic process. Instead it
entails a number of stages of a cognitive process itself. The stages go from
understanding the question, making the decision to respond, and how to respond
through to the method of, and actual retrieval of memory, and finally the presentation
of the response. For example, the questions represent the intentions of the researcher.
The task the respondent faces is the interpretation and understanding of the idea that
the researcher is trying to communicate (Clark and Schober, 1992).
The comprehension phase of answering a survey question, for example, comprises
two inter-related processes (Clark and Schober, 1992; Strack, 1992). The first is the
literal meaning of the question. The respondent must recognize and comprehend the
meaning of the particular words. Where words of ambiguous origin or multiple
meanings occur, the respondent must infer or choose which meaning is intended. The
more ambiguous the meaning, the more likely the effects of context will emerge.
Respondents are likely to choose the meaning most accessible in their memories,
which is most likely to be triggered by the context of previous questions, or the social
context in which the survey is being answered (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz,
1996).
Each of the questionnaire processes (comprehension, judgment formulation, answer
formatting, and answer editing) is subject to manipulation by the researcher and by the
respondent. Shrauger and Osberg (1981) report that although in some circumstances
people can report their behavior fairly accurately, it is not certain that they will. For
instance, in the final stage of editing their answer, respondents may feel pressure to
respond in what they perceive to be a culturally appropriate manner. For example,
visitors to national parks might feel it is inappropriate to be too critical of the
management of the park for fear that this may be interpreted as being ungrateful for
the opportunity to visit. There may be a strategic self-serving bias to their responses.
In the knowledge that their answers may influence the management of the park, they
respond in a manner which will preserve their interests.
We can expect the pressure of a social situation to also influence both how the
questions are interpreted, and which of the response alternatives is chosen (Dijkstra
and Zouwen, 1987). The possibility of such response effects will be higher if the topic

of the question is not salient to the respondent, if the topic leads to anxiety arousal for
the respondent, or if the response alternatives offered differ in terms of social
desirability (Dijkstra and Zouwen, 1987). "The use of alternative self-report
procedures that may be less familiar to respondents and may obscure socially
desirable responses" is suggested by Dovidio and Fazio (1992, p. 217) as a way to
reduce bias in report and recall.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS
Subjects may also be concerned about how they appear to themselves. Their responses
may be perceived to be statements about their own identity. Sudman (1987) reports
data that "suggest that people prefer to interpret their own behavior in ways that
reflect positively on themselves and that they actively seek alternative interpretations
only when the more immediately obvious interpretation has negative implications for
their self-image" (p. 15). There may be desires to be consistent. Or they may be
hoping for a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that what they report is how they would like to
be. However, as Shrauger and Osberg conclude, "The motivation to present oneself in
a favorable light should invalidate self-assessments only when it is stronger than the
desire to be accurate" (1981, p. 347).
Respondents feel the need to respond as a result of social pressures to do so. Few
people wish to appear stubborn or stupid, and the very asking of a question suggests
that the respondent should have an answer or opinion. Respondents are guided by the
norms of a conversation, in that what is asked is assumed to be truthful, relevant,
informative and clear (Grice, 1975). Similarly, a person's interest or motivation may
affect what is remembered, as well as what is reported. His or her own goals will act
as a filter to the information recalled, but also as a lens through which they consider
the information in the first place. People tend to "remember past events so as to be
consistent with their present attitudes" (Strube, 1987, p. 90). Therefore, the context in
which recall is undertaken can be easily manipulated by effecting current attitudes.
Earlier questions and answers in the questionnaire may also bias the recall and report
of events and experiences (Bishop, 1987; Schwarz and Sudman, 1992). There is social
pressure for one to be logical and consistent. Respondents tend to use earlier answers
as evidence for later judgments. Because of a quest for structure, many people
interpret successive questions as related (Clark and Schober, 1992). Earlier items may
prime or refresh ideas, prejudices, or contexts that will affect later questions. Earlier
questions and answers might prime specific features not intended for interpretation,
such as normative standards, previous behaviors, consequences, or moods (Strack and
Martin, 1987). Even the order of response alternatives or the number or content of

response categories can affect response. Early options also set the tone for subsequent
choices (Hippler and Schwarz, 1987).
The action of giving a seemingly satisfactory but less considered answer is called
"satisficing". And as Krosnick (1991) describes, "Satisficing may lead respondents to
employ a variety of response strategies, including choosing the first response
alternative that seems to constitute a reasonable answer, agreeing with an assertion
made by the question, endorsing the status quo instead of endorsing social changes,
failing to differentiate among a set of diverse object in ratings, saying 'don't know'
instead of reporting an opinion and randomly choosing among the response
alternatives offered" (p. 213). The likelihood of satisficing is increased by the
increasing difficulty of the recall task, the respondent's ability to recall and cognitively
process, and by the motivation (personal, social or physiological) to recall and process
information (Krosnick, 1991).

THE IMPACT OF MOOD ON RECALL AND REPORT
Further complicating the matter of recall and report is the robust effects of mood on
cognitions, particularly memory (Singer and Kolligan, 1987). Mood has, for example,
been demonstrated to have strong effects on a respondent's evaluation of general life
satisfaction (Schwartz et al., 1987; Sudman, 1987). Indeed, Laird (1989) has
suggested that mood affects memory in much the same way as other cognitions. It has
been shown that people recall material that fits their beliefs, attitudes, expectations
and self-concept better than that which does not (Laird, 1989; Palfai and Salovey,
1992). If we are in a good mood at the time of recall, then we will have better recall of
good mood episodes (Davies, 1986; Schwartz et al., 1987). In addition, the effect of
mood can be manipulated by the use of questions that bring positive or negative
material to mind, thereby changing the current mood.
This would tend to suggest a more general principle of recall and report : material is
more likely to be remembered and reported if the context of recall is similar to the
context in which it was first experienced and entered into memory. It is not necessary
to physically reconstruct the location, rather to create in the remembrance sufficient
details of the external environment that will also trigger remembrance of the affective
or emotional response at the time of the event. Thus, the more specific the
reconstruction, the greater the likelihood of eliciting specific memories and details
(Sudman, 1987). For example, according to the Encoding Specificity Principle
(Tulving, 1983) a cue will only activate information if the relationship between cue
and information is the same at retrieval as it was at the time of acquisition.

BETTER SELF-REPORT

There are strategies available based on the insights discussed above for improving the
accuracy of verbal reports. Overall, we need to view the verbal report from the eye of
the respondent and the burden which we are placing upon him or her. The task of
reporting should be straightforward and relevant, in such a manner that motivates and
facilitates accuracy. Also, bear in mind that respondents often view the survey as a
converstation, and will not, for instance, reiterate information they provided earlier,
nor offer information that they feel the research would take for granted (Sudman,
Bradburn and Schwarz, 1996).
Verbal reports are best when the information being sought is normally available in the
respondent's memory. Thus, questions seeking report of states such as feelings,
attitudes, and significant events will have more success than those about motives,
causes or processes (McClure, 1983). Subjects may not normally think so much about
how things happen as compared to what happens (Willis et al., 1991), therefore it is
best to stick to descriptive recall rather than interpretations about what happened
(Ericsson and Simon, 1972). Questions should be as specific and explicit as possible
in time, place and context (Shrauger and Osberg, 1981). They should be of a nature
that is significant and interesting to the respondent.
It should also be noted that, "respondents' answers depend on the information
accessible to them at the time they answer the question and on the way in which they
use the information to form a mental representation of the attitude object or behavior
under question. For information to be used, it must be available in memory, that is, it
has to have been encoded and stored. However, not all information potentially
available in memory can be retrieved at a given point in time, that is, it may not be
accessible" (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz, 1996, p. 213).
Verbal reports should be made as easy a task as possible. This ranges from making the
questions as simple and straightforward as possible, to allowing the respondents to
recall events in whichever order they find easiest (Jobe et al., 1990). Subjects should
be motivated for accuracy and honesty, and led to the expectation that they are
capable of accurate recall. Relatively short questionnaires lower the burden on the
respondent and raise the validity and reliability of verbal reports (Singer and Kolligan,
1987).
While it is important to explain what is being sought by the experimenter, it is also
important to lessen the desirability of responses that are strategic or self-presentational
(Shrauger and Osberg, 1981). While recreation researchers have been concerned about
the quantity of responses (response rate), equal attention should also be given to the
quality of response. Similarly, a balance should be sought between stressing the
importance of literal accuracy in responding to the questions and lessening the
apprehension of evaluation of the task of remembering (White, 1987).

Perhaps most important of all to accuracy of verbal report is the delay between what is
being reported and when it is reported. Memory appears to decay exponentially with
time (Bernard et al., 1984). As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) summarize : "perhaps chief
among the circumstances that should decrease accuracy in self-report is a separation
in time between the report and the actual occurrence of the process." Smith et al.
(1991) found that overall memory performance deteriorated as the memory retention
interval increased from zero to six weeks.
Real-time methodologies such as the Experience Sampling Method (Csikszentmihalyi
and Larson, 1987; Samdahl, 1992; Borrie, 1995) are particularly suited to the verbal
report of states (feelings, opinions, and events). The Experience Sampling Method
entails having the subject carry a number of copies of the survey questionnaire, as
well as an alarm or signal to indicate when the questionnaire should be completed
(anywhere up to twelve or more times per day). The gap between the actual situation
and report is minimal. Indeed, it would seem that there are several reasons to adopt
alternative approaches such as the Experience Sampling Method (ESM). First, the
recall of states or experiences is much more prone to alteration and reliance on
hypothesized behavior relationships than is the report of traits and more stable
opinions. Second, the manipulation of recall is minimized, as is the tendency for
strategic responding, in that with ESM the emphasis of the research task is on
reporting the 'here and now'. Third, the context of reporting is as close as possible to
the event itself. Finally, ESM allows for focused retrieval on specific aspects of the
experience.
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